

Jean-Baptiste Say and Spontaneous Order

Evelyn L. Forget

During the eighteenth century, a set of profoundly new ideas that would later be identified as “spontaneous order” began to emerge in British social theory. The label captures two notions. First, in any period of time during which institutions are given, the market tends toward an order in response to individual self-regarding behavior such that each individual is led by an invisible hand to advance the social interest without knowing it or desiring it. Second, and much more profoundly, spontaneous order suggests that over the centuries social institutions emerge and evolve in a gradual and unplanned way as a response to individual self-interested behavior. Those institutions survive that are, somehow, successful, while others are gradually transformed or wither away altogether.

Earlier ideas of natural order that posited a human society modeled on divine and eternal principles and operating under the oversight, if not the direction, of a deity began to be challenged by these arguments, which slowly and imperfectly and often inconsistently began to appear in the

Correspondence may be addressed to Evelyn L. Forget, Community Health Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, University of Manitoba, 750 Bannatyne Avenue, Winnipeg, MB R3E 0W3, Canada. I would like to thank a number of people who directed me toward particular source material and made very acute and useful comments on earlier drafts of this essay: Andrew Skinner, Philippe Fontaine, Robert Hébert, Sam Hollander, Mark Perlman, Margaret Schabas, Philippe Steiner, John Ridpath, and Anthony Waterman. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees who encouraged me to restrain (or at least move into footnotes) some of my more colorful flights of fancy. Responsibility for errors remains mine. Earlier drafts of this article were presented at the York–University of Toronto workshop and at the 1998 HES conference in Montreal. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

History of Political Economy 33:2 © 2001 by Duke University Press.

context of the Scottish Enlightenment. Friedrich Hayek (1978), Knut Haakonssen (1981), and others have identified this development with Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith. From these rich sources, Hayek claims, emerged a new kind of social theory that he and others after him referred to as the “theory of spontaneous order” (see Hamowy 1987).¹ The message was quickly assimilated, and by the end of the eighteenth century, Samuel Johnson, Adam Smith, Josiah Tucker, William Paley, Edmund Burke, Edward Gibbon, and Thomas Malthus, among many others, could all be found arguing that the various activities of any society, especially but certainly not exclusively its economic activities (Haakonssen 1981, 12–35), arise in a gradual and unplanned manner as a consequence of individual self-regarding behavior.²

Jean-Baptiste Say, while clearly aware of the writing of Smith (Forget 1993; Hashimoto 1980, 1982), builds a coherent social analysis that accepts, to some extent, the idea of spontaneous order within the context of the marketplace, but emphatically rejects the idea that social institutions evolve and develop as an unplanned response to the uncoordinated behavior of many discrete and self-interested agents. Instead, he develops a version of “organicism” that portrays society as a “social body” or single organism, and assigns a much more significant role to legislators and administrators than does, for example, Smith. This essay attempts to determine how, precisely, Say’s social thought differs from the ideas of spontaneous order beginning to establish themselves in Scotland. There were rather distinct social and political differences between France and Britain during the period that might have influenced the extent to which

1. But John Stuart Mill ([1873] 1969, 381) refers to “the spontaneous order of Nature” in “Nature,” the first of his *Three Essays on Religion*: “The consciousness that whatever man does to improve his condition is in so much a censure and a thwarting of the spontaneous order of Nature, has in all ages caused new and unprecedented attempts at improvement to be generally at first under a shade of religious suspicion.” Moreover, he opens his “Considerations on Representative Government” with a caricature. At one end of the intellectual spectrum, Mill claims, are those who believe that social order requires the self-conscious intervention of legislators and administrators who are charged with the duty of creating social institutions according to the precepts of a rationally conceived plan. At the other extreme are those who view government as a “spontaneous product” of individuals pursuing their own interests. Mill ([1861] 1977, 374–75) is quite aware that this is a caricature, recognizing that “it would be difficult to determine which position is more absurd if either were held exclusively.”

2. Many commentators have seen in this development a Kuhnian “paradigm shift” or a change in Imre Lakatos’s “scientific research program” (see Meek 1973, viii; Latsis 1976; O’Brien 1975, 78–84; and Hirschman 1977, 42–48).

either society was receptive to these ideas, but my concern in this essay is with purely intellectual matters. What was it in Say's thinking that resisted a set of ideas, of which he was certainly aware, that was proving so attractive across the channel?

This essay addresses four questions. First, what textual evidence exists for my claim that Say did not fully incorporate the evolutionary concept of spontaneous order into his social analysis? Second, why did Say choose not to adopt such a key Smithian concept? Third, how does Say's treatment of spontaneous order relate to his well-known claims that "wealth is independent of the nature of government" and that the science of political economy is not a branch of the science of the legislator (Say 1803, ii)? And fourth, is there any evidence that Say's thought underwent a transition over his lifetime such that spontaneous order played a greater role in his more mature thought than it did in 1803?

My argument, in brief, is that Say was quite aware of the idea of spontaneous order in the marketplace, canonically represented by Smith's invisible hand. But he constrained it to the marketplace, building his society instead upon the ideas that had come to him in various forms from the physiocrats and, more directly, from the revolutionary thinkers with whom he associated.³ These specifically French sources embody the idea that social order is a consequence of good legislation and, even more important, of good education designed to subordinate individual self-seeking behavior to the social good by teaching people their true interests which are, in more cases than not, harmonious. The key difference between Smith and Say's economic analysis, then, turns on the much more expansive roles afforded the legislator, the administrator, and the educator by Say. And while there is some evidence that Say was more sympathetic to Smith's system of natural liberty at the end of his life than he was in 1803, the transition is a very subtle one. He never fully adopts Smith's analysis.

3. Recall the well-known passage from Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* in which Smith ([1759] 1984, pt. 6, sec. 2, chap. 2, para. 18) refers to "the man of system" who treats individuals as chess pieces to be moved around at will. In note 6, paragraph 12, the editors note: "It seems likely that Smith had the French Revolution in mind when writing this and succeeding paragraphs. His remarks in [paragraphs] 15 and 17 about a 'spirit of system' and 'the man of system' may refer to the constitution-makers of 1789, or perhaps to the rationalist philosopher Richard Price . . . especially if Smith is echoing [Jean le Ronde] d'Alembert's disparaging use of the phrase 'the spirit of system' to describe rationalism in the Preliminary Discourse of the *Encyclopédie*."

This essay is less about who did influence Say, than it is about who did *not* influence him, at least in this context. It would be impossible to trace all the sources of Say's organicism, precisely because such ideas were pervasive in France and, indeed, throughout Europe. Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, for example, develops a set of ideas very similar to those of Say in the "Éloge de M. Gournay" ([1759] 1808–11) (see Groenewegen 1977, chap. 4). But Say reread with appreciation and annotated Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776) as he was preparing the first edition of the *Traité d'économie politique* (1803) (Forget 1993; Hashimoto 1980, 1982). He was hardly a slavish imitator, but it seems legitimate to ask why he remained impervious to what some have seen as a key aspect of Smith's analysis and, indeed, why he maintained throughout his life some central ideas that are entirely inconsistent with Smithian analysis. The answer we find in the organic social analysis he developed in the context of *idéologie*.

Did Say Adopt Smithian Notions of Spontaneous Order?

While spontaneous order was a widely disseminated idea by the end of the eighteenth century,⁴ it was neither universally acclaimed nor well integrated into the social analyses of even its most sympathetic readers. Is there any textual evidence to support my claim that there are significant differences between the degrees to which Say and Smith were prepared to recognize a system of spontaneous order?

The claim is not an obvious one. Say begins his last significant contribution to political economy, his *Cours complet d'économie politique*

4. Among its more unexpected appearances is this passage from the Marquis de Sade's *La Nouvelle Justine, ou les malheurs de la vertu* (1797), the four volumes of which comprise the first part of the definitive edition of this work, of which the second part, in six volumes, bears the title *La Nouvelle Justine, ou les Malheurs de la Vertu, suivie de l'Histoire de Juliette, sa soeur [ou les Prospérités du vice]*: "A totally virtuous universe could not endure for a minute; the learned hand of Nature brings order to birth out of chaos, and wanting chaos, Nature must fail to attain anything: such is the profound equilibrium which holdeth the stars aright in their courses, which suspendeth them in these huge oceans of void, which maketh them to move periodically and by rule. She must have evil, 'tis from this stuff she creates good; upon crime her existence is seated, and all would be undone were the world to be inhabited by doers of good alone. . . . Why do we decline to acknowledge that she has done with men what she has done with beasts? are not all classes, like all species, in perpetual strife, do they not mutually batten one upon the other, does not one or the other weaken, wilt, perish away, depending upon the state or shape which Nature's laws must give to the natural order?" ([1797] 1988, 172, pt. 1). But I must concur with Octavio Paz (1998, 81), who notes that Sade's "ideas have undoubted interest; nevertheless, . . . he was not Hume."

pratique ([1828–29] 1843), with a statement that seems to recognize that the idea of spontaneous order lies at the heart of economic analysis and that he agrees with it:

Dugald Stewart has argued forcefully, in his *Elements of the Philosophy of the human mind*, that it has long been imagined that social order is entirely the effect of art; and that wherever defects are apparent in this order, that is necessarily the consequence of a lack of foresight on the part of the legislator, or by some negligence on the part of the magistrate charged with the supervision of this complicated machine. From this is born the plans for imaginary societies such as Plato's *Republic*, More's *Utopia*, Harrington's *Oceana*, etc. Each has believed it possible to replace a defective organization with a better one, without paying attention to the fact that there exists in societies a *nature of things* that is independent of the will of man, which we cannot arbitrarily ignore. (1)

This seems a relatively clear statement that the “nature of things” does not depend on the art or the foresight of the administrator; that is, that social order and social institutions result from some kind of a “natural” process independent of the plans of legislators and administrators.

Moreover, he acknowledges that individual self-interest is central:

If we set aside the interior relations between the members of a family that can be considered as forming a single individual because their interests are common, and the purely personal relationship of a man with his Creator that one can hardly consider as part of the social body, all social questions reduce to the valuation of reciprocal interests. (2–3)

But Say, in fact, does not take the next step. He is clearly well aware of the social analysis of the Scottish Enlightenment, and he recognizes both the importance of individual self-regarding behavior and the inherently limited capacity of legislators and administrators to shape the social order in a beneficial way. But this does not imply that he sees social order arising as the unintended consequence of individuals' separately pursuing their own interests.

Individual interests, properly understood, are, according to Say, generally harmonious, in the same way that the “true interests” of the individual organs in a human body cannot be other than harmonious. Just as it is in the “interest” of the heart and the liver to keep the host body alive,

it is in the interest of the individual organs of the social body to maintain the health of society. Say's organic metaphor is particularly telling:

Political societies . . . are living bodies, just like human bodies. They only exist and survive through the actions of the organs of which they are composed, just as an individual body only survives through the action of its organs. The study of the nature and functions of the human body has created a set of ideas, a science, to which has been given the name *physiology*. The study of the nature and function of the different parts of the social body has similarly created a set of ideas, a science, to which has been given the name *political economy*, but which might better be named *social economy*. (1)

Spontaneous order presupposes an ecological nature of society. Order emerges as the unintended consequence of the interaction of many discrete organisms. By contrast, Say's organicism is based upon an anatomical or physiological notion of society as a single organism. The former allows for each discrete organism to behave according to a self-interest that is distinct and, perhaps, opposed to the interests of other organisms or society. The latter, by contrast, requires some way to ensure the harmony of individual interests.

And what of those cases where the interests of the individual organs of the social body appear to be in opposition? That requires, according to Say, the recognition that these issues are "the province of morality, of legislation, perhaps of speculative politics, as much as the province of political economy" (4). One cannot count upon order to emerge spontaneously; the social body needs its physicians.

Although Say recognizes that the study of political economy suggests that, "in most cases, it is best to leave men to themselves, because it is thus that they best develop their faculties" (16), it does not follow that they cannot benefit from understanding those laws that govern such development. In particular, "what man has no interest in understanding the strengths and the weaknesses of the social position into which fate has cast him?" (16). And more to the point, "people and governments ignorant of their true interests persecute one another for insignificant or absurd dogmas and declare war through jealousy or in the belief that the prosperity of another is an obstacle to their own happiness" (10). And it is, as I shall demonstrate, the duty of legislators, of social philosophers, and of political economists to teach individuals their true, and harmonious, interests.

The distinction between Say and Smith becomes clear when one considers the duties of the legislator. As is well known, Smith introduces his system of natural liberty as an attack on mercantilist policies that give the legislator the power to determine which industries to encourage and which to suppress. His system, by contrast, allows the legislator, at least theoretically, “only three duties: (1) the defence of the country; (2) the administration of justice, and (3) the maintenance of certain public works” ([1776] 1981, bk. 4, chap. 9, 687).

A narrowing of the scope allowed a legislator has been attributed to Adam Smith, in a charge that Donald Winch (1996, 94), while he rejects it, has articulated well: “If the main lesson of Smith’s science is that human affairs are best left to ‘the natural course of things,’ what positive part is there for *any* legislator to play? The only virtues he is being advised to cultivate seem to be those of the contemplative philosopher, observing natural historical and economic processes and issuing pious warnings about the harmfulness of artificial expedients.” Those commentators who claim that Smith offered little room for the wise legislator as a shaper of social outcomes are surveyed by Winch (1978, chaps. 1, 8) and have been resurrected most recently by Shannon Stimson (1989) and Peter Minowitz (1993).

There is, however, evidence that Smith allows the legislator important duties in adjusting institutions and laws to new economic circumstances (see Winch 1996, 88; Haakonssen 1981, 90; and Hollander 1973, 256–58), mitigating the detrimental effects of progress (Winch 1996, 88), establishing public works and providing public education (Haakonssen 1981, 92; Hollander 1973, 273), and providing justice and security (Haakonssen 1981, 93; Hollander 1973, 264–65). Smith does not contemplate ongoing direct intervention in the economic activities of each citizen, or efforts on the part of the lawgiver to spread political insight through direct political education. Nevertheless, he does allow a significantly broader scope for the legislator to mold society, even in addition to his somewhat unexpected defense of usury laws, than the abstractly presented theory of spontaneous order would seem to permit (see Hollander 1973, 257–58).

But Say goes further. The first edition of the *Traité* makes many references to the potentially beneficial intervention of an enlightened administration in helping to bring about a prosperous and industrious state. For example, the administration might aid in the diffusion of machines in manufacturing (1803, 1:48), and government might ease the disruption

machines cause for the working classes (1:53). Government should take special care to encourage the improvement and diffusion of commodities destined for the consumption of the most numerous class (1:140). Industrial experiments might be encouraged by a wise government, especially in agriculture, where the risk often dissuades individuals from undertaking them independently (1:141, 146). And government must help to diffuse the knowledge without which prosperity cannot occur (1:340–43).

Say's *Traité d'économie politique* does not suggest that a spontaneous order would emerge in society through the self-interested actions of individuals, except (sometimes) in the context of the marketplace. Consequently, the legislator (or more properly the enlightened administrator, who was clearly distinguished from the self-interested politician,⁵ a villain who reappeared throughout Say's political economy) was given a role much broader than Adam Smith contemplated. The enlightened administrator takes his place, in Say's early writing, alongside the teacher and the legislator.

According to Say, the legislator had two tasks in addition to those allowed by Smith. First, citizens need help to discern their true interests, most especially outside the marketplace; individuals cannot be expected to determine their own correctly. Second, Say argued that an industrious culture could only emerge with the help of legislation and education, and the wise statesman was integral to the system (Say 1803, chaps. 13, 19, 20). Both of these tasks of the legislator promote the public interest, and neither the comprehension of true interests nor an industrious culture will emerge spontaneously through the attempts of individuals to pursue their own interests.

One persistent puzzle is why Say believed that administrators and teachers would know an individual's true interests better than the individual herself. In his 1796 article "Boniface Veridick," he suggests that contemporary French society is so complex, and the general population so ignorant, that the best one can hope for is that the population might be trained to select individuals of good intellectual and moral character to represent their interests. These benevolent individuals would, because of

5. The distinction between the legislator "whose deliberations ought to be governed by general principles which are always the same," and "that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs," is also made by Smith ([1776] 1981, bk. 4, chap. 2, 468). For an insightful discussion of the role of the legislator, see Winch 1978, 159–60, 170–73.

their innate character and superior learning, be better able to understand that the fundamental interest of all individuals is the maintenance of the society in which they live. Moreover, they would recognize in a way that less able and less educated people may not, that the pursuit of narrow sectarian interests can destroy society and, hence, is not in their “true interests.” The same kind of analysis runs through *Olbie* (1800a), Say’s utopian novel. People need to be educated about the nature of the society in which they live; such an education can best be provided in the form of architecture and statues that recall the virtues, and in the form of publicly displayed maxims that recall to individuals their true interests, that help shape behavior gradually, as individuals develop new (constructive) habits without conscious decision and thought (Say 1800a, 75–80). This education would be supplemented by the active recognition and reward of individuals who behave in accord with their “true interests,” the public denunciation of individuals who display narrow, egoistic interests (71–72), and the development of festivals and spectacles that encourage the development of appropriate values and attitudes (69–70). In a well-run society, the administrators and legislators are those people who know better than ordinary people what is in their “true interests.” This is a crucial difference between Smith and the Scottish tradition and is, indeed, a refutation of spontaneous order as applied to social order.

Within the context of the marketplace, however, Say is much more inclined to allow that individuals can very often determine what is to their advantage with a high degree of accuracy. In the case of the allocation of capital by individual entrepreneurs, for example, individuals can be expected to discern their own interests with little assistance. And yet, individuals may well need the help of the enlightened administrator to understand that a progressive income tax system, which reduces the degree of economic inequality, is in the true interests of the wealthy as well as the poor because it is consistent with peace and security and the maintenance of society (Say 1800a, n. G). So the distinction that Say is prepared to draw is not between economic institutions per se and the rest of society, but rather between the narrowly defined marketplace and the rest of society. And indeed, the market only works if individuals do know their true interests; education is (for Say as for Smith) an instance where individual self-interest cannot be trusted to generate the socially optimal investment.

In his “Essay on the Principle of Utility” (1848a), which was originally intended to be included in his *Cours complet* and was written in

response to the charge of unrestrained egoism that emanated from such writers as Benjamin Constant and Mme. de Staël, Say distinguishes very clearly between unrestrained egoism, which he identifies as the pursuit of apparent, perhaps poorly understood, and immediate interests, and self-interest, which is based on well-understood and true interests. The true interests of an individual may diverge from apparent interests for three reasons: “insanity, ignorance, and passion” (719). Insanity means that one might desire that which he knows is harmful to him. Ignorance means that one might be unaware of the harmful qualities of that which he desires, or attribute beneficial qualities to something which it does not, in fact, possess. And passion is “a weakness that makes them sacrifice a future good to the satisfaction of a present appetite, or a present and incontestable good, to a future and uncertain good, like the Trappists” (719). Say is again clear about the merits of education: “Whoever works to enlighten ignorance, to battle against insanity, and to submit the passions to the empire of reason, is a benefactor of humanity and works effectively for the happiness of men” (719). Teaching people their true interests involves precisely this battle.

Say is quite certain that the press is an important tool of education, and that education involves the public debate of all sides of every issue. It involves, that is, the cultivation of the intellect—the ability to discern correctly one’s own interests—in addition to the inculcation of correct opinion. A tyrant with the will to deceive is virtually indestructible, Say claims, when a free press does not exist (731).

This essay also makes clear how utilitarianism is related to individual psychology in Say’s social analysis. Say notes that welfare requires the pursuit of “true interests,” “well-understood” (727), but asks whose interests ought to be pursued? Obviously (he says) it ought not to be the interests of the governor at the expense of the people, or the few at the expense of the many (726). But Say insists that well-understood interests are very often harmonious:

The faithfulness to fulfill an onerous engagement is nothing but the obedience to an interest that one rightly sees as superior to the passing and dangerous benefits that one gains from not fulfilling that obligation. One fulfills it through the sentiment of general utility, of the faithfulness to promises; one fulfills it so as not to authorize the violation of obligations from others toward oneself; one fulfills it to be seen

as a man of honor, and to enjoy the advantages attached to probity and esteem. (726)

Clearly, enlightened people are those who recognize that their true interests include the preservation of the contractual basis of the society in which they live.

If anyone is so unenlightened that he cannot see the gains from fulfilling his obligations, then the civil code exists to force him to do so. The civil code comes about, according to Say, because it was created in advance by “objective men, who were justly convinced of the advantages that men would generally enjoy as long as they are faithful to their obligations” (729):

Well-made laws are the best guides that one can give to those who are too little enlightened to know their true interests; the more advanced one is in this knowledge, the less one has need of laws; but, at the same time, well-made laws all conform to the principle of utility, because who would dare defend a law demonstrated to be harmful? (729)

Say notes that people who understand well their own true interests have little need of law. Such people recognize the underlying harmony of interests, which stems from the recognition that one lives in society, and that the maintenance of that society is beneficial to oneself as well as others. The fact that his civil code was created “in advance” by “objective men” distinguishes it very clearly from British common law, which Hume, for example, uses as a key illustration of the evolutionary nature of spontaneous order; common law evolves as an unintended consequence of individual self-regarding behavior. The civil code, by contrast, is “created” by “objective men.”

Adam Smith had similarly recognized the limitations of narrow self-interest, arguing that landlords may simply be too indolent and “incapable of that application of mind” to understand, let alone pursue, their own interests ([1776] 1981, bk. 1, chap. 11, 265); that workers, lacking leisure and education, may be ignorant of their own interests (266); and that capitalists may, through their own unequal access to economic and political power, be able to impose their own interests on the other orders of society by arguing that particular policies are in the public interest (267). But both *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *The Wealth of Nations* take a far less benign view of the capacity of elected officials,

public administrators, and public educators to teach individuals their true interests.

Why Did Say Not Advocate Smith's System of Natural Liberty?

While Say was developing the first edition of his *Traité d'économie politique*, he was affiliated with the *idéologues*,⁶ a group of writers and scientists characterized by Pierre-Louis Roederer⁷ as “soldiers of the philosophical party,” a phrase already in use in the 1750s and 1760s to refer to the *Encyclopaedists* (see Lutfalla 1991, 16).⁸ These individuals, who never formed a “school” or “sect” with anything like a coherent and uniform doctrine, nevertheless coalesced around the moral philosophy of Destutt de Tracy and the physiology of P.-J.-G. Cabanis and applied the method of the *Encyclopaedists* to all of the human sciences. Like Tracy, Say developed a social analysis self-consciously based upon a sensationalist philosophy drawn from Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, explicitly used the method of “analysis” that was seen as fundamental to any scientific investigation, and borrowed the insights, methods, and metaphors of physiology. The *idéologues* wrote in an intellectual context shaped by physiocracy but developed an analysis that differed in significant respects from physiocracy.

In 1767, Paul Mercier de la Rivière published *L'ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques*, and on the basis of his argument “property,” “liberty,” and “security” were united into a “*formule sacramentale*” that captured the political orientation of physiocracy (Welch 1984,

6. “Idéologiste” is Destutt de Tracy’s word; “idéologue” is Bonaparte’s. The secondary literature refers to the “idéologues.” (See my *The Social Economics of Jean-Baptiste Say: Markets and Virtue* [1999] for the story of the relationship between these popular philosophers and Bonaparte.)

7. Roederer was a more widely recognized economist in 1800 than was Say. The importance attributed to Roederer is captured by his entry in the “supplément” to *Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne*, published in 1846, where Roederer “l’un des personnages les plus célèbres de nos révolutions” (1846, 79:294–316) gets twenty-three pages (in all fairness, not solely because of his economic analysis), in contrast to Say’s much more modest entry (1827, 81: 224–34). In contemporary encyclopedias, Roederer merits hardly a mention.

8. The label *parti philosophique* is used by Sergio Moravia (1968, 7) to refer to the Auteuil circle, which included Jean-Baptiste Say, Destutt de Tracy, P.-J.-G. Cabanis, and others who met regularly at the salon of Madame Helvétius. Roederer probably meant the term to refer to the group of moderate republicans associated with the *Institut national*. While there was some overlap, the congruence is not perfect.

200 n. 15).⁹ The physiocrats essentially argued that human beings are governed by natural law, but that natural law can only be discovered through empirical evidence rather than theoretical speculation. And the evidence seemed to show that human beings are motivated by self-interest, and that they sought happiness, which was identified with material consumption. But the natural laws that governed this human behavior also imposed moral obligations that increased with the complexity of social organization. Rights, therefore, were based on individual interests that were consistent with a system of natural justice (Welch 1984, 10).

This analysis had been used to advocate economic reform in France of a type similar to that advocated by Smith: “natural” (economic) order ought to be freed from “unnatural” systems of encouragement and constraint. Turgot, however, always distinguished his own work from that of the physiocrats and was seen by Say as someone who “had his own ideas.” Say cites Turgot’s work very favorably, especially in his later writings (see, for example, Say [1828–29] 1843, 100 n). Turgot’s “Éloge de M. Gournay” contains such passages as this, which seem to foreshadow Say’s own concerns:

M. de Gournay did not pretend to limit the duties of the government towards commerce strictly to that of maintaining its free course and removing the obstacles that oppose the improvement of industry. He was also quite convinced of the usefulness of the encouragements that could be given to industry either by recompensing the authors of useful inventions, or by encouraging, by prizes or gratuities, a competition among artisans to attain perfection. He knew that even when industry enjoyed the most complete freedom, these measures are often useful in hastening a natural progress, and that they are essential above all when the fear of constraints has not been completely dispelled. (quoted in Groenewegen 1977, 31–32)

In the preamble to the 1803 edition of the *Traité*, Say distinguishes Turgot’s work from that of the physiocrats. Turgot’s “Éloge” only became readily available in the Du Pont edition of Turgot’s works in the nineteenth century, but was published in *Le Mercure* (August 1759, no. 8) and circulated relatively widely (Groenewegen 1977, 20 n). The extent

9. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese (1976) discusses the physiocratic conception of natural law and rights.

to which Say was aware of Turgot's work this early in his career is difficult to discern, but neither Say's economics nor the philosophical underpinnings of his social analysis was developing in a vacuum. All of these ideas informed the writings of the *idéologues*.¹⁰ But there were important distinctions.

Politically, the physiocrats advocated absolute monarchy. With the French Revolution, however, physiocratic doctrine was adapted by various people identified with *idéologie*¹¹ as justification for the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and was used to implement political reform by abolishing absolute monarchy and replacing it with the sovereign authority of the National Assembly. The attempt to construct a scientific theory of natural law was based on the sensationalist philosophy of John Locke, transmitted via Condillac. Condillac never renounced the idea that natural law is the decree of God, but he did argue that sense experience is the source of all knowledge about natural law, rather than theoretical discourse or revelation (Knight 1968). And his analysis attempted to justify political order on the basis of psychological "facts," using the language of social contract. But there was one crucial difference between Condillac and *idéologie* that accounts for the much more interventionist stance of the latter.

Condillac, like Locke, imagined human beings as "statues" endowed with senses who discover the world through their sensory data. Tracy, the acknowledged philosopher of *idéologie*, took issue with such a mechanical representation. Human beings are not automatons, he argued, but rather beings endowed with "will." The foundations of Tracy's social analysis can be found in volume 4 of his *Elémens*, where he considers the problem of human will. It seemed obvious to Tracy that human rights are generated by needs (1817–18, 4:79). Moreover, a need is, according to Tracy, a pure sensation that gives rise to the perception of pleasure or pain in an individual, but an individual can only conceive of needs in terms of desires, which are a matter of will (4:79). For example,

10. The intellectual and social connections of the *idéologues* have been documented in a number of places. Martin Staum (1996) explores both the institutional and intellectual connections between these writers and their contemporaries in a very thorough and engaging study. Cheryl Welch (1984) explores the connections between Tracy and Say; Brian Head (1985), those between Tracy and Cabanis. Moravia (1968) has a thorough discussion and brings in many of the more peripheral figures. J. Kitchin (1965–66) documents the role of *La Décade* in the development of *idéologie*. I summarize some of the evidence in Forget 1999, chap. 3.

11. The revolutionary pamphlets of C.-F. Volney, Nicolas Condorcet, and Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès are the most well known.

an individual may feel hunger, which is a pure need. But the individual processes that sensation of hunger by remembering the sensation that is generated by consuming food, comparing the two sensations, which is a matter of judgment, and then formulating the desire to consume food, which is a matter of will. The desire for food is the way in which an individual perceives the need generated by hunger. The construction of desires, however, is not instinctive or automatic. Desire or will is a social process, and individual wills can be affected through appropriate education. Human judgments, that is, might be “corrected” through an educational program designed to teach individuals their true interests (Tracy 1798a, 356).

This justification for ideological educational programs was intricately intertwined with physiology, and this science was used as much more than the source of the social body analogy. If society is imagined as a single body, then one must articulate some principle that prevents the individual organs of the social body from working at cross-purposes and pursuing their own apparent interests at the expense of the entire organism. What the *idéologues* chose to argue was that an underlying commonality of interests existed, notwithstanding the apparent divergence of interests that Tracy (1798b, 11–12), for example, articulates so clearly. The role of the educators and administrators was to teach individuals their true interests and thus maintain or restore the health of the social body.

Ironically, it is the concept of sympathy, an idea drawn from David Hume and, more directly, from Sophie de Grouchy’s translation of Adam Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, that is invoked both to suggest the existence of a basic commonality of interests and to justify the various educational techniques proposed by the different *idéologues*. Grouchy’s commentary on *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is contained in eight letters addressed to Cabanis and appended to the translation. In her view, “Smith limited himself to noting the existence [of sympathy] and discussing its principal effects” (Grouchy 1798, 357). She regretted that he chose not to push further and locate its source in “the nature of sensations that make us feel pleasure and pain” (368), nor to recognize that, although it finds its source in physical sensation, sympathy is completed “by reflection” (369). She finds “no need to prove that the more sensibility is exercised, the more vivid it is” (364) and urges the reader to

recognize the importance of the environment in creating opportunities for the cultivation of sympathy (365–68, 370–86).¹²

Cabanis accepts Grouchy's analysis¹³ and articulates the physiological foundation of sympathy most clearly in a series of twelve lectures, of which six were read at the *Institut national* in 1796 and 1797 and published as *Rapports du physique et du morale de l'homme* ([1802] 1867). The idea was developed into the foundation for both moral education and social analysis:

I will add only one reflection: that is that the faculty of imitation which characterizes all life, and notably human nature, is the principle method of education, both of individuals and societies; that one finds it in a way blended at its source with sympathetic tendencies, upon which the social instinct and almost all the moral sentiments are based; and that this tendency and this faculty are equally part of the essential properties of living matter combined into a system. Thus, the causes that develop all the intellectual and moral faculties are indissolubly tied to those that produce, conserve, and set in motion the organization [of the individual], and it is within the very organization of the human race that the principle of its perfectibility is to be found. (Cabanis [1802] 1867, 2:287).

That is, sympathy is fundamental to human intellectual and moral education, and it is also fundamental to society. There is a natural basis for the sympathy that the *idéologues* would cultivate in the very organization (or physiology) of human beings. And most notably, as Grouchy (1798, 369) argued, the cultivation of sympathy “repairs some portion of the evils that personal interest engenders in large societies.”

In the tenth lecture, titled “De la sympathie,” Cabanis ([1802] 1867, 2:284) defines sympathy as “the faculty of sharing the ideas and affections

12. I am not suggesting that Grouchy's analysis of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is necessarily correct. Many historians have found significant physiological references in the volume, and others have noted correctly that Smith emphasized education. But Grouchy's comment apparently persuaded Cabanis, and I do think that Cabanis, in particular, contributed to an analysis that pushed beyond Smith in both directions.

13. Cabanis ([1802] 1867, 2:283–84) recognizes that the concept of sympathy is borrowed from Scottish philosophy: “[Francis] Hutcheson had recognized its great power over the production of sentiments, and of which Smith had made a very learned study, which was nevertheless incomplete for want of his having linked it to physical laws, and which Madame Condorcet, by means of simple rational considerations, knew how to remove from the vagueness in which it was left by the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.”

of others; in the desire to make them share one's own ideas and affections; in the need to act upon their will." The universal human ability to imitate one another rests behind one person's ability to understand another's "perceptions, judgments, desires" (284), without having to directly experience the precipitating event. Indeed, imitation is "the aptitude to reproduce, without the need for the same degree of force and attention, all the movements that the different organs once executed," and "that aptitude grows with repetition" (285). Like any "muscle fiber," the physical correlates of moral sympathy can be strengthened with exercise: "That which characterizes muscular action occurs equally in other functions: only it is other organs and other types of movement, and as a consequence there are also other results" (286). Once one has felt the internal stimulus that excites the cerebral organ to respond in a particular way, one is in a position to understand its operation in others, or simply in one's imagination, without the need to experience the situation directly (286).

Moral sympathy, according to Cabanis, exerts its influence "by means of glances, physiognomy, by means of exterior movements, through articulated language, by tones of voice, in a word, by all the signs: its action can be detected by all the senses" (286). But it would be an error to conclude that moral sympathy is a simple instinct, because "the effect of glances, physiognomy, and even gestures is not uniquely moral; it remains, if I can speak thus, a mixture of direct organic influences that appears to be independent of reflection. But one must not doubt that the most important part . . . is susceptible to cultivation; that its development is proportional to effort and to intelligence; in the end, the sympathetic moral sentiments are almost entirely a series of imperceptible judgments" (286–87). That is, as Smith had argued in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* ([1759] 1984, pt. 1, sec. 1, chap. 4, para. 7), sympathy is less a simple instinct than an act of judgment, relying upon the cultivated imagination.

Cabanis recognized that his analysis was leaving the province of pure physiology, and argued that sympathy, at this point, "enters the realm of ideology and morality; it is up to these sciences to complete the analysis" (287). Tracy and Say take this notion one step further: if sympathy can be cultivated, ought it not be one of the primary goals of the educational system to cultivate such a necessary aspect of social life? Tracy and Say both argue that the education of individual citizens requires the development of sympathy, particularly in children, who are more amenable to

improvement than adults reared under the *ancien régime* (Tracy 1798b; Say 1800a). Despite Tracy's greater pessimism concerning the extent to which adults can be transformed, both share Cabanis's claim that sympathy grows stronger through exercise, and postulate that theater, various kinds of spectacles, parades, and so on, which exercise the emotions and encourage sympathy, are more effective than the dull lectures of teachers. Similarly both, but especially Tracy (1798b, 15, 32–33), fear the consequences of manipulation of the "passions" by unscrupulous agitators. There is very little spontaneity about this discussion of sympathy; the people can, very often are, and probably ought to be influenced by those who understand the power of sympathy as an organizing force in society. The only questions are who gets to exercise that influence, and to what ends? Clearly, there is a very real role for teachers, administrators, legislators, and social theorists to play in the society imagined by the *idéologues*: individuals must be helped to understand their true interests, which are in harmony with the interests of society as a whole, and they must be protected from those who would manipulate their very plastic sympathy to questionable and narrowly egoistic ends.

How Is Say's Treatment of Spontaneous Order Reflected in His Economic Analysis?

Jean-Baptiste Say shared both the ideological concept of sympathy as a social organizing principle and Adam Smith's reliance on a self-regulating market order based upon mutual self-interest. Therefore, one would expect him to deny that social organization outside the market would be characterized by a tendency toward spontaneous order through the self-interested actions of individuals, while maintaining the importance of the invisible hand in the organization of the marketplace.

This division between the market and the rest of society is directly confirmed in the body of Say's writings. Say introduces the first edition of his *Traité* with great praise for Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and, despite Smith's claim that political economy is a branch of the "science of the statesman or legislator," Say (1803, 1:i) claims that "until the moment Smith wrote, Politics, properly called the science of government, was confused with Political economy, which demonstrates how wealth is created, distributed, and consumed." But "since Smith, these two bodies of doctrine have been constantly distinguished: the name Political economy has been reserved for the science which treats the wealth of nations,

and that of Politics alone designates the relationships that exist between the government and the people, and those between governments” (1:iii).

Say distinguished his own political economy from that of the physiocrats, from James Steuart, and, significantly, from Rousseau’s article in the *Encyclopédie*; he accused all three figures of confusing purely political considerations with political economy (1803, 1:iii). But:

Wealth is independent of the nature of government. Under any form of government, a state may prosper if it is well administered. Absolute monarchs have enriched their countries, and popular councils ruined theirs. Even the forms of public administration only influence the formation of wealth, which is almost entirely the work of individuals, *indirectly and accidentally*. (1:ii; emphasis added)

The indirect and accidental nature of the formation of wealth seems to recognize the role of spontaneous order in the marketplace, but Say does not extend that principle to the realm of politics. That is, markets may be ordered spontaneously; societies are not. Say, then, argued that the science of political economy was not a branch of the science of the legislator.

The intellectual distinction Say was prepared to emphasize between politics and political economy allowed him to separate the two senses in which the theory of spontaneous order appeared in the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment. He believed that it was possible to advocate individual initiative in market transactions and to imagine that the institution of the market somehow accommodates individual self-interested behavior, without advocating a passive role for a legislator in a society that also develops incrementally through the self-interested actions of individuals. Because these are two separable analyses, Say could advocate a very active role for an enlightened administrator or legislator to shape institutions in the public interest, including economic institutions, and even to shape individual morality, as he does in *Olbie*, while simultaneously arguing that the invisible hand of the marketplace must be allowed the liberty to accommodate individual economic activities driven by self-interest.

Say’s attempt to distinguish between “economics” and “politics,” however, is not entirely satisfactory. Say may have believed that “wealth is independent of the nature of government,” but it seems apparent that if the nature of government differs, then there will certainly be economic repercussions. For example, it would seem that the simplicity of

“republican” manners coupled with a more equal distribution of income would entail an entirely different pattern of consumption than would the *ancien régime*. It does not take a great deal of imagination to contemplate differing patterns of investment and savings, public expenditure, and so on. Say’s intellectual separation of the two spheres rests upon his distinction between “public administration” and the “nature of government.” Public morality, he believed, and therefore economic behavior, was influenced by the former. And good administration was, in principle if not historically, consistent with any political organization. That is, the analysis returns to Say’s very typically ideological notion that experts and technicians have a significant responsibility for shaping human behavior, and that their success depends upon science rather than political considerations. Say, then, constructs a social analysis that protects the political analysis of *idéologie* against inroads from the theory of spontaneous order, while allowing Smith’s invisible hand significant freedom to order the marketplace. It is a fragile analysis, perched upon two largely irreconcilable systems of thought.

Say’s conception of the role of the administrator is consistent with two articles on political matters that Say published in *La década*.¹⁴ In 1796 (“Boniface Veridick”), Say reflected upon the role of the citizen in the modern French state and contrasted it to the role that citizens were expected to play in ancient Rome and Greece. He recognized that while the National Assembly may have been composed of men of common sense and enlightenment at the outset of the French Revolution, it had deteriorated through the effects of intrigues and parties. The people must learn, he claimed, to choose good representatives. But because the modern state was a system of representative democracy, Say (1796, 40) argued that “if they could but choose from among themselves men of common sense and probity who supported republican government, I would demand nothing more of them.” Citizens could allow the government, and in particular the well-educated administrators of the civil service, to see to the establishment of those institutions necessary to the creation of a “comfortable” state in which economic activity flourishes:

14. The articles in *La década* to which I refer are “Boniface Veridick à Polyscope sur son projet de théâtre pour le peuple” and “Sciences sociales: compte rendu de Cabanis ‘Quelques considérations sur l’organisation sociale en général et particulièrement sur la nouvelle constitution.’” For a different interpretation of these articles, see Steiner 1997.

I would desire that peace characterize [such a state], that a general confidence unite all citizens; I would wish that a firm government would guarantee from the outset their independence and their internal security. I would wish that agriculture and all species of industry would be characterized by brilliant activity; that the seaports full of ships, the canals and rivers covered with boats, the markets tidy and well provisioned, offer the appearance of abundance. I would desire that each farm laborer, each city artisan, have, if not an independent property, at least the prospect of procuring one for his old age, even if it is no more than a little life annuity. I would like for each household, its utensils clean and well cared for, its clothes of good fabric and its linen clean, to indicate, not opulence, but ease everywhere; that each would know how to read and have in his cupboard at least a few volumes to learn of the progress of the arts and also a few newspapers, so that he would not be ignorant of the interests of the state. I would want public theaters, stamped with the mark of utility to inspire in those who attend not the sadness of a suffering humanity, but the contentment that comes from the spectacle of succored humanity. I desire, in a word, that in this great republic, there would be not a single idler whose unproductive existence is a burden for society, not a single pauper who, with work and good conduct, could not earn an easy subsistence and lead a life that the English call *comfortable*. (42–43)

The role of the administrator and legislator in bringing about such a state of affairs is twofold. Economic well-being must be assured by guaranteeing peace, property, and order. And the enlightened encouragement of public morality, which would be the product of a campaign of public education, must be established.

Is There Evidence of an Intellectual Transition?

The transition in Say's thought between this optimistic faith in the ability of experts, whether teachers or legislators, to bring about the utopian vision Say articulated in 1796 and again in 1800, and the much less optimistic vision of his mature reflection on *Olbie*, could hardly be clearer. If the legislators and administrators could be trusted in 1800, a few years of Bonaparte and the debates surrounding the growth of the liberal opposition during the restoration of the French monarchy ensured the greater

reliance the older Say placed on active and well-informed citizens to constrain inherent threats of despotism:

I will not give men the honor of believing that they will ever see a time when there will not be tyrants among them; but I see that their work becomes more difficult in proportion as nations become more enlightened, and note that it is not necessary for a nation to be composed of scholars to be what I call enlightened. (Say 1848b, 581–82)¹⁵

Say thought his change of heart so significant that it required *Olbie* to be reconstructed “on an entirely different foundation,” emphasizing the importance of general education in constraining tyranny. If the optimistic voice of *Olbie* sounds in the first edition of the *Traité*, it is this somber tone that finds its place in the *Cours complet*, where Say ([1828–29] 1843, 569) castigates the physiocrats for their “legal despotism.”

Say’s reorientation is perhaps most clear in the opening lecture to his course at the College of France for the academic year 1832–33, delivered only a few weeks before his death. He distinguishes very clearly between “civil society” and “government” and recognizes the importance of the former in limiting the excesses of the latter. Most important, he dismisses outright the idea that the governors know more about anyone’s true interests than the governed:

Nor is it an accurate picture, probably produced in government ante-chambers, that represents the citizens as sheep and those set up to care for the interests of the community as shepherds. Such an analogy can only reduce human dignity to the condition of brutes. Political sheepfolds are no longer suited to an age of maturity. (quoted in Palmer 1997, 156)

This is very different in tone from the earlier writing we have just explored.

That a widespread change of political orientation occurred, probably during the Empire, and was made manifest when the restoration allowed the publication of many new books, seems uncontroversial. Richard Fargher (1952, 220–38), for example, has documented the fundamental impact of Bonaparte and the Empire on the changing spirit of the

15. This particular passage was written as an aside in a bound volume of Say’s writings now in the possession of Arnold Heertje and published by Say’s literary executors (without a date of composition) in *Oeuvres diverses* (1848b). Heertje’s volume appears to have been bound in 1826, so the comment was likely written after that date (see Schoorl 1980, 33 n. 41).

age, and this orientation is reflected in scathing correspondence between François Andrieux and Say (Kitchin 1965–66, 93). Emmet Kennedy (1978, 190) documents Tracy's similar disdain for Bonaparte after the declaration of Empire. It is not surprising, I think, that the evolution of liberalism, with its inherent desire to limit the power of government, might have accompanied Bonaparte. It is, perhaps, a bit surprising that Robespierre was not a sufficient inducement.

It is, however, important not to overstate the extent of Say's intellectual transition. That Jean-Baptiste Say maintained even after Empire the vision of human nature captured in his earliest work can be inferred from his "Essay on the Principle of Utility," in which Say very effectively discusses the distinction between the passions, sympathy, and self-interest and the link between individual psychology and utilitarianism. That this was written well after the revolutionary decade attests to the fact that Say's vision of human nature did not change markedly, because it is entirely consistent with his earliest writing. All that changed was Say's willingness to trust in the good intentions of those persons placed in positions of political power. He did not abandon the belief that education could be effective in changing an individual's perception of his own interests.

Conclusion

The theory of spontaneous order was one intellectual justification for the stability of social organizations. Society, according to this theory, is comprised of many individuals with quite distinct interests, and yet does not collapse into chaos because the self-interested actions of individuals "adjust themselves." And over time, formal and informal institutions evolve in such a way that those which prove successful, in some sense, survive, while those which do not help to bring about order are eliminated.

This is a very distinct social theory from that advocated by the *idéologues* and the physiocrats, for example, in which a strong legislator is required in order to teach people their true interests, including an appreciation for the underlying harmony of interests. No such harmony is postulated by the theory of spontaneous order. Interests are genuinely conflicting, and the order in the larger system comes about as an unintended consequence of several individuals, each pursuing his own interest. That is, order is a consequence of social interaction between individuals in

conflict; it is not an assumption based upon some notion of sympathy naturally overpowering self-interest, nor is it ensured at the outset because administrators or legislators successfully instill the idea that true interests cannot be at odds with the “general will.”

Say’s intellectual commitment to the notion of spontaneous order in the marketplace, and his simultaneous commitment to the ideological conception of an underlying harmony of true interests based on the cultivation of sympathy and an active role for a legislator, led him to emphasize the distinction between politics and political economy.

References

- Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne*. 1811–63. 83 vols. and supplement. Paris: Michaud frères.
- Cabanis, P.-J.-G. [1802] 1867. *Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme*. 2 vols. Paris: Victor Masson et fils, libraires-éditeurs.
- Fargher, R. 1952. The Retreat from Voltaireanism. In *The French Mind: Studies in Honour of Gustave Rudler*, edited by W. Moore, R. Sutherland, and E. Starkie. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Forget, Evelyn L. 1993. J.-B. Say and Adam Smith: An Essay in the Transmission of Ideas. *Canadian Journal of Economics* 26.3:121–33.
- . 1999. *The Social Economics of Jean-Baptiste Say: Markets and Virtue*. London: Routledge.
- Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth. 1976. *The Origins of Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth Century France*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Groenewegen, P. D. 1977. *The Economics of A. R. J. Turgot*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Grouchy, S. 1798. Lettres à C[abanis], sur la théorie des sentimens moraux. In *Théorie des sentimens moraux*, by Adam Smith. Translated by Sophie de Grouchy, Marquise de Condorcet. Paris: F. Buisson.
- Haakonsen, Knut. 1981. *The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hamowy, Ronald. 1987. *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Hashimoto, H. 1980. Notes inédites de J.-B. Say qui couvrent les marges de la *Richesse des Nations* et qui la critiquent: rédigées avec une introduction. *KSU [Kyoto Sangyo University] Economic and Business Review* 7:53–81.
- . 1982. Notes inédites de J.-B. Say qui couvrent les marges de la *Richesse des Nations* et qui la resument: rédigées avec une introduction. *KSU [Kyoto Sangyo University] Economic and Business Review* 9:31–133.

- Hayek, F. A. 1978. *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Head, Brian W. 1985. *Ideology and Social Science: Destutt de Tracy and French Liberalism*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1977. *The Passions and the Interests*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Hollander, Samuel. 1973. *The Economics of Adam Smith*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Kennedy, E. 1978. A "Philosophe" in the Age of Revolution: Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of "Ideology." Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
- Kitchin, J. 1965–66. *Un Journal "Philosophique": La Décade (1794–1807)*. Paris: M. J. Minard.
- Knight, I. 1968. *The Geometric Spirit: The Abbé de Condillac and the French Enlightenment*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Latsis, S. J. 1976. *Method and Appraisal in Economics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lutfalla, Michel. 1991. Jean-Baptiste Say, le fondateur. In *L'économie politique en France au XIXe siècle*, edited by Yves Breton and Michel Lutfalla. Paris: Economica.
- Meek, R. L. 1973. *Precursors of Adam Smith*. London: Macmillan.
- Mercier de la Rivière, Paul Pierre Le. [1767] 1910. *L'ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques*. Edited by E. Depître. Paris.
- Mill, J. S. [1873] 1969. Nature. In *Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society*, edited by J. M. Robson. Vol. 10 of *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- . [1861] 1977. Considerations on Representative Government. In *Essays on Politics and Society*, edited by J. M. Robson. Vols. 18 and 19 of *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Minowitz, P. 1993. *Profits, Priests, and Princes: Adam Smith's Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Moravia, Sergio. 1968. *Il Tramonto dell'Illuminismo-Filosofia e Politica Nella Società Francese (1770–1810)*. Bari: Laterza.
- O'Brien, D. P. 1975. *The Classical Economists*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Palmer, Robert R. 1997. *J.-B. Say: An Economist in Troubled Times*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Paz, Octavio. 1998. *An Erotic Beyond: Sade*. Translated by Eliot Weinberger. New York and London: Harcourt Brace.
- Sade, Donatien Alphonse François, the Marquis de. [1797] 1988. *Juliette*. Translated by Austryn Wainhouse. New York: Grove Press.
- Say, J.-B. 1796. Boniface Veridick à Polyscope sur son projet de théâtre pour le peuple. *La década*, 10 Germinal, year 4 [of the French Republic]: 38–44.
- . 1800a. *Olbie: ou essai sur les moyens de réformer les moeurs d'une nation*. Paris: Deterville.

- . 1800b. Sciences sociales: compte rendu de Cabanis “Quelques considérations sur l’organisation sociale en général et particulièrement sur la nouvelle constitution.” *La décade*, 10 Nivôse, year 8 [of the French Republic]: 9–17.
- . 1803. *Traité d’économie politique*. 2 vols. Paris: Deterville.
- . [1828–29] 1843. *Cours complet d’économie politique pratique*. Paris: Guillaumin.
- . 1848a. Essai sur le principe de l’utilité [Essay on the principle of utility]. In *Oeuvres diverses de J.-B. Say*, edited by Ch. Comte, E. Daire, and H. Say, 719–31. Paris: Guillaumin.
- . 1848b. *Oeuvres diverses de J.-B. Say*. Edited by Ch. Comte, E. Daire, and H. Say. Paris: Guillaumin.
- Schoorl, Evert. 1980. *J. B. Say*. Amsterdam: Coöp. Drukkerij PET u.a.
- Smith, Adam. [1759] 1798. *Théorie des sentimens moraux*. Translated by Sophie de Grouchy, Marquise de Condorcet. Paris: F. Buisson.
- . [1776] 1981. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- . [1759] 1984. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Edited by D. D. Raphael and A. Macfie. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Staum, Martin. 1996. *Minerva’s Message: Stabilizing the French Revolution*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- Steiner, Philippe. 1997. Politique et économie politique chez J.-B. Say. *Revue Française d’Histoire des Idées Politiques* 23–58.
- Stimson, Shannon C. 1989. Republicanism and the Recovery of the Political. In *Critical Issues in Social Thought*, edited by M. Milgate and C. Welch, 91–112. London: Academic Press.
- Tracy, Destutt. 1798a. Mémoire sur la faculté de penser. *Mémoires de l’Institut national des sciences et arts-sciences morales et politiques* 283–450.
- . 1798b. *Quels sont les moyens de fonder la morale chez un peuple?* Paris: Chez H. Agasse, Imprimeur-Libraire, rue des Poitevins, no. 18.
- . 1817–18. *Elémens d’Idéologie*. 4 vols. Paris: Courcier.
- Turgot, A.-R.-J. [1759] 1808–11. Éloge de M. Gournay. In vol. 3 of *Oeuvres de M. Turgot*. Paris: de Delance.
- Welch, Cheryl. 1984. *Liberty and Utility: The French Idéologues and the Transformation of Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Winch, Donald. 1978. *Adam Smith’s Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1996. *Riches and Poverty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.