ON ADAM SMITH'S LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE*

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The importance of the discovery of another set of student's notes of Adam Smith's lectures on Jurisprudence, hereafter LJA, and its publication in the Glasgow edition of The Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, does not seem, as yet, fully to have been appreciated by scholars. There are, of course, some exceptions, notably Haakonssen's extensive treatment of Smith's views on jurisprudence as they are presented in this new set of lectures, which relate to the session of 1762-1763. In fact, these lectures provide a more accurate picture of Smith's position as compared to the so called Cannan notes, hereafter cited as LJB.

As far as the development of Smith's economic thought is concerned, however, LJA does not seem to contribute much to our understanding of the subject. This is partly because of incomplete coverage of Smith's course, since LJA leaves out about one third of the police section and the whole of those on revenue and arms. This does not mean, of course, that in the economic sections of LJA we cannot find several interesting passages which may help scholars to obtain a better appreciation, by checking differences and similarities, of the development of Adam Smith's ideas on a wide range of subjects; for example, the influence of Hume's theory of specie flow adjustment, or the more extensive role played by the division of labour.

But it must be admitted that apart from a few scattered hints, LJA does not help us to throw as much new light as we might have hoped on Adam Smith's treatment of two fundamental topics, namely value and distribution, and their relation to the Wealth of Nations. Nevertheless, LJA, together with the so-called Anderson notes, appear to be really

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2 According to Ronald L. Meek the relevant lectures to which these notes refer were probably delivered in a date between 1751 and 1752. However, "the evidence is also consistent with a date after 1755. But the general feeling one gets, looking at the evidence as a whole . . . is that the balance of probability lies in favour of an earlier date rather than a later one" (R. L. Meek, 'New Light on Adam Smith's Glasgow lectures on Jurisprudence', History of Political Economy, 4, 1976, p. 461.

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invaluable for the better detection and evaluation of the influences working on Smith in the period which preceded his journey to France in 1764.

I

Following the edition of LJB, we can ascribe essentially to Cannan and Scott the merit of drawing attention to Smith's indebtedness to his old teacher, Francis Hutcheson, in developing the main topics included in his lectures. It is well known that Hutcheson used the manuscript of his *System of Moral Philosophy* (published posthumously in 1755) as early as 1737,\(^3\) *i.e.* before Smith was attending his lectures. It is also well known that Smith was as deeply impressed by the personality and the teaching ability of the "never-to-be-forgotten Dr Hutcheson", as much as by the content of his lectures. In this context we can add, moreover, that along with his treatment of ethics and justice, Hutcheson lectured for many years on political economy, as a branch of his course on moral philosophy.

Leaving out the ethics, let us consider the jurisprudence section of Hutcheson's *System* as compared to Smith's corresponding treatment in LJB. Following Scott, we may observe first that though the actual coverage of the subjects is the same, nevertheless the order of treatment is reversed.\(^4\) As Smith explicitly states in LJB: "The civilians begin with considering government and then treat of property and other rights. Others who have written on this subject begin with the latter and then consider family and civil government. There are several advantages peculiar to each of these methods, tho' that of the civil law seems upon the whole preferable.\(^5\)

In LJA, on the contrary, as R. L. Meek has more recently shown,\(^6\) the parallels with Hutcheson's treatment of justice become more striking. Table 1 illustrates this point more clearly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Hutcheson's System</th>
<th>LJA</th>
<th>LJB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Law</td>
<td>Book II, vi–xiii</td>
<td>i.12–ii.180</td>
<td>149–201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Law</td>
<td>Book III, i–iii</td>
<td>iii.1–iii.147</td>
<td>101–148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) W. R. Scott, *Adam Smith as Student and Professor* (Glasgow, 1937), p. 112, 231.
\(^5\) LJB, p. 401.
Going still further, by comparing the sequence of individual topics included in LJA with the order of treatment followed in the System and in the Anderson notes, we can obtain this table, which is a modified version of that found in Meek.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence of topics in LJA</th>
<th>Corresponding pages in Anderson notes</th>
<th>Hutcheson's System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Book II, iii–v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property (including testaments)</td>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>Book II, vi–viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>7–14</td>
<td>Book II, ix–xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Law</td>
<td>15–22</td>
<td>Book II, xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband and wife</td>
<td>23–27</td>
<td>Book III, i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent and child</td>
<td>27–30</td>
<td>Book III, ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master and servant</td>
<td>30–36</td>
<td>Book III, iii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:*

The relevant facts here are that not only is the order of the individual topics in LJA and in the Anderson notes the same, as Meek has pointed out, but that there is also a remarkable similarity with the corresponding order followed by Hutcheson in his System of Moral Philosophy.

In summing up these elements we can say that at least until the 1762–63 session, Adam Smith was following the same order of treatment used by Hutcheson, covering ethics, private law, domestic law, and public jurisprudence. The missing pieces here are the sections devoted to Police, Revenue, and Arms, with which Smith ended his course on moral philosophy. Scott and Taylor have already pointed out the striking similarity between the way in which Smith dealt with the “economic section” of LJB and Hutcheson’s treatment of the same subject in his System, by showing the interesting parallels which exist on such topics as the division of labour, value, money, price, etc.8 To this list we can perhaps add Hutcheson’s hints to the government’s duties in assuring a proper education, “especially for young minds”, as a basis for a civilised social life and in providing an adequate defence for the country, not by using inherently dangerous standing armies, but through the training of the “whole people”.9

The sequence in which these topics were treated is shown in the following table by making a comparison between Hutcheson’s System and the two separate sets of Adam Smith’s lectures that we now possess.

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7 Ibid., p. 453.
8 W. R. Scott, Francis Hutcheson (Cambridge, 1900); W. L. Taylor, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as predecessors of Adam Smith (Durham, 1965).
ON ADAM SMITH'S LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE

TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects:</th>
<th>Hutcheson's System</th>
<th>LJA</th>
<th>LJB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>That opulence arises from the division of labour</td>
<td>II, v, p. 288</td>
<td>vi. 21–28</td>
<td>211–213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That the division of labour multiplies the product</td>
<td>II, v, pp. 288–89</td>
<td>vi. 28–43</td>
<td>213–218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What gives occasion to the division of labour</td>
<td>II, v, pp. 289–90</td>
<td>vi. 44–57</td>
<td>218–222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That the division of labour must be proportioned to the extent of commerce</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>vi. 63–66</td>
<td>222–223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural price</td>
<td>II, xii, p. 53</td>
<td>vi. 58–63</td>
<td>223–227 &amp; 67–69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market price</td>
<td>II, xii, p. 54</td>
<td>vi. 70–75</td>
<td>227–229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation between market price and natural price</td>
<td>II, xii, p. 54</td>
<td>vi. 75–97</td>
<td>229–235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money as a measure of value</td>
<td>II, xii, pp. 55 ss.</td>
<td>vi. 97–103</td>
<td>235–237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money as a medium of exchange</td>
<td>II, xii, pp. 55 ss.</td>
<td>vi. 103–126</td>
<td>237–244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National opulence does not consist in money</td>
<td>II, xii, p. 57</td>
<td>vi. 133–146</td>
<td>251–256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory and rate of interest</td>
<td>II, xiii, pp. 71 ss.</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation of rent</td>
<td>II, xiii, pp. 71 ss.</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>291–293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>III, ix, pp. 311–317</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>329–330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and international trade</td>
<td>III, ix, p. 319</td>
<td>vi. 158–168</td>
<td>261–266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>III, ix, pp. 323–325</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>334–338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxims of taxation</td>
<td>III, ix, pp. 340–342</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>307–320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 3 shows, the sequence of topics in the three documents is roughly the same. The main differences lie in the fact that the space devoted to the "economic section" is more extensive in Smith's treatment than in Hutcheson's. In addition all these topics, with the exception of the chapter on "The value of goods in commerce, and the nature of coin", are scattered throughout the System, whereas in the Lectures they are more logically arranged under the headings of "Police", "Revenue", and "Arms".

Hutcheson included his chapter on value in the section devoted to private law, under the heading of "Contracts". In Scott's view, "the System and Compend of Morals are very badly divided", while according to Taylor, the inclusion of the discussion of value under the section on contracts is further evidence of this "bad" arrangement. "For some obscure, unknown reason, Hutcheson sandwiched his most crucial economic chapter, "Concerning the Values or Prices of Goods" between a chapter on "Oaths and Vows" and one on the "Several Sorts of Contracts". The interesting point here, as Meek has clearly shown, is

11 W. L. Taylor, op. cit., p. 23, italics mine.
that this "is exactly how and where the analysis of prices, money, and interest entered into the course of Smith's lectures from which the Anderson notes were derived". The reason for such a choice is explained by Hutcheson himself, where he says that "in settling the values of goods for commerce, they must be reduced to some common measure on both sides". However, this is not the only reason we can adduce to explain the inclusion of this chapter under the general heading of "Contracts" in both Hutcheson's System and the Anderson notes. As will be further discussed below, the other reason does not lie, as Meek seems to imply, in Hutcheson's own method of arranging this subject.

II

Whether badly arranged or not, the order of treatment in Hutcheson's System strictly follows Pufendorf's De officio hominis et civis (1673) and the De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1722).

As many scholars have pointed out, the linking figure here is Hutcheson's teacher, Gershom Carmichael, whose major achievement was the translation of Pufendorf's De officio from German to Latin and to which he added observations and supplements (Glasgow, 1718). Carmichael's notes moreover are essentially characterised more by the attempt to provide a link between Pufendorf's De Jure and the De Officio, the latter being a relatively short abstract of the former, than by a desire to provide an original contribution. Nevertheless, Carmichael performed an important role in propagating the new ideas put forward by Pufendorf in Scotland and making them familiar to the students of his moral philosophy class in Glasgow, who included Francis Hutcheson. In this connection, as stressed by Taylor, two elements must be emphasised in Pufendorf's works in respect of their deep influence on the Scottish thinkers of the XVIIIth century: "the subordination of jurisprudence to ethics, and the attempt to ground human laws in the observation and analysis of the observed characteristics of human nature." 

However, if the influence of Carmichael on Hutcheson cannot be denied, it should not be over-stated, and it would not be correct, or, at least, not entirely so, to state that Hutcheson taught Pufendorf via Carmichael. We know from Scott that Hutcheson, after having been appointed professor of Moral Philosophy in 1730, "at first taught Pufendorf and the Compend of his predecessor Carmichael, but later, he delivered written lectures with many digressions and additions, which were substantially the same as the System of Moral Philosophy." We know, moreover, that for the first time in Glasgow University Hutcheson

15 W. R. Scott, op. cit., p. 63.
preferred to teach directly in English—whereas all Carmichael’s works were written in Latin. And, last, but not least, the direct evidence that Hutcheson’s students, who included Adam Smith, were trained to use the main sources directly, and not only Carmichael’s *Compend*, is clearly shown by the fact that both the English edition of Grotius’ *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1682) and Pufendorf’s *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* (1703), owned by Glasgow University Library, present the same handwritten inscription on their frontispiece: “Ex libris Classis Ethicae in Academia Glasguensi Anno 1732.”

A close examination of the links between Hutcheson’s *System* and Pufendorf’s works, in terms of the relative amount of space devoted to the different subjects, shows that the *System* is closer to Pufendorf’s *De Jure* than to the *De Officio*, the latter being much more orientated to jurisprudence, whereas the former with its wide treatment of ethics in the first book, followed by the sections devoted to private law, domestic law, and public jurisprudence, point out a parallel with Hutcheson’s *System* not only with regard to the order of treatment of the sections, but also in respect of the individual topics. It is precisely in this context that we can find the further answer we are looking for the “obscure, unknown reason” why, in the *System*, and in Smith’s lectures, from which the Anderson notes were derived, the chapter on value is included in the general discussion of contracts. In the *De Jure* and in the *De Officio*, Pufendorf proceeds from the chapters dealing with the different means of acquiring property to those dealing with contracts, starting with the chapter “Of Price”, and the reason for this choice is explained by the fact that in this section he is essentially concerned with onerous contracts, as the title of the following chapter clearly shows: “Of Contracts in general that presuppose the Price of Things”. Let us note in passing, by referring essentially to the *De Jure*, that the first seven chapters of Book V are closely related to economic issues. Pufendorf’s treatment of price, money, interest, and rent, is very similar to Hutcheson’s, and all these chapters are pervaded by an impressive vision of contemporary society as an enormous arena of buyers and sellers; a vision that affected Hutcheson and that could well have had a very distinct impact on a reader such as Adam Smith.

III

Following the publication of the Anderson notes and of the new set of Smith’s lectures delivered in the 1762–63 session, the role played by Pufendorf and Hutcheson in the development of Adam Smith’s ideas can also be better appreciated in connection with the so-called “Four Stages” theory. This theory is presumed to be one of the main themes of Smith’s thought in the Glasgow period.

In its mature form, the theory involved the idea that societies naturally
develop through four successive stages hunting and fishing, pasturage, agriculture, and commerce—each of which were based on different modes of subsistence and characterised by corresponding changes in the concept of property and political organisation. Looking at the 1762–63 lectures (LJA), all these points are strongly confirmed, and we can say that Smith’s pervasive use of the theory, starting with the section devoted to the development of property rights, seems to place the theory itself as the organising principle of the entire course.

Turning now to the Anderson notes, all that we can gather from them is essentially included in the section devoted to the development of property. The first stage is characterised by “hunting and fishing”; the second by the appearance of property in common within a clan or nation of both the spontaneous fruits of nature and the “arable ground and crops” and the third by permanent settlements and private property in land. This is all, and, as far as Smith’s account is concerned, we must also add that it is very vague. Despite Meek’s great commitment in conjecturing that in the lectures to which the Anderson notes relate Smith may “have specifically associated property in common with pasturage” or that he could have been closer to the mature “four-stages” theory than these notes would at first sight seem to suggest”, we must agree with him that by the early or middle 1750's Smith “was still using his stadial theory more or less exclusively in connection with the problem of changes in the state of property”.16

However, if this conclusion, from a certain point of view, notably weakens the hypothesis of Smith’s priority in putting forward an original version of the theory,17 from another point of view, it helps us to understand more accurately from whence he gathered some of the elements most conducive to the elaboration of a mature version of the theory.

In this connection we must start with the consideration that, at the time of the Anderson notes, Smith was working strictly within the Pufendorf tradition.18 According to Pufendorf’s treatment of the development of property, mankind moved from negative to positive community in the first ages, or, in Hutcheson’s words in commenting on Pufendorf, from

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16 R. L. Meek, op. cit., p. 466.
17 According to R. L. Meek “Smith’s use of the four stages theory, or at any rate of something closely resembling it, may be dated back at least as far as his early years in the chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow” (Social Science and the Ignoble Savage, Cambridge 1976, p. 110) and perhaps even further, to the Edinburgh lectures delivered from 1748 until Smith’s departure to Glasgow in 1751 (see also Smith, Marx & After, London 1977, p. 24–8). These statements, however, because of the scarcity of direct evidences, are essentially based on conjectures, as Meek himself admitted: “there is as yet no absolutely unequivocal evidence that Smith had in fact used the four stages theory in his Jurisprudence lectures before Darlymple and Kames published their version of it in 1757 and 1758 respectively. Nor, in those of Smith’s writings ascribable to the period up to 1760 . . . is there any clear and direct reference to the four stages theory as such” (Social Science . . ., op. cit., p. 112–13).
18 On Pufendorf’s contribution to the four stages theory, see ibid., p. 17–23.
the "state of things not yet in property, but lying open to the occupation of anyone" to "the state of things in which not any individual but a whole society have an individual property". Only subsequently was the right of property individually established, first on moveable, and after on immoveable things. Moreover, both Pufendorf in the De Jure and Smith in the Anderson notes stress the basic idea that "things did not pass all at once into [proprietorship], but successively", and that the original cause of these changes is essentially related to the growth of population. Finally, we can add that Pufendorf introduces two more points that are missing in the Anderson notes, i.e. the relation existing between these "stages" and the corresponding changes in the mode of subsistence as stated, for example, in the following passage:

"... it was not necessary separate dominions should immediately be introduced, so long as men were yet few in number, and followed a simple unimproved way of living; but when their race was considerably multiplied, and when industry had advanced the conveniences of life, then the necessary regard to the preservation of society recommended the distinction of properties."22

Moreover the relation which exists between changes in property rights and corresponding changes in law, which was to become one of the recurring themes of Smith's mature version of the four stages theory, is clearly implied in the following passage:

"... it must be confessed that before the division of properties, a very few heads of law might have been sufficient for the government of mankind."23

Turning now to Hutcheson, a close examination of both A Short introduction to moral philosophy (Glasgow 1747) and A System of moral philosophy shows, despite Meek's assessment of this point, that all of what was said above concerning Pufendorf's use of a "stadiial" categorisation, can also be applied to Hutcheson's. This is shown by the following passage, which is included in Hutcheson's treatment of development of property:

"Before mankind were much increased, if the regions they possessed were so very fruitful and mild that there was plenty of all conveniences..."

20 A similar train of thinking may be found in Grotius' De jure which, in turn, greatly influenced Pufendorf's work.
22 Ibidem.
23 Ibid., p. 331.
24 In his discussion of the 'prehistory' of the four stages theory, by referring to Hutcheson, Meek says: 'All we find are a few vague hints, thrown out in the course of his discussion of man's rights over animals, and his account of the original means of acquiring property—"viz. occupation, and labour employed in cultivating" (Social Science... op. cit., p. 29).
without any uneasy labour, there was little occasion for any further rules of property. But as the world is at present, and as mankind are multiplied, the product of the earth, without great labour, is not sufficient to maintain one hundredth part of them. Pastures for cattle as well as corn are plainly owing to human labour, since almost all lands would grow into woods unfit even for pasture, were it not for the culture of man. The very subsistence therefore of our species, as well as all our agreeable conveniences, require an universal laborious industry."25

The remarkable thing to note here is that in his discussion of the original methods of acquiring property, i.e. by the occupation of things formerly held in common, Hutcheson is referring to the first state of mankind using Pufendorf's concept of negative community. And according to Pufendorf's account, in this age men "live on herbs, root, fruits of chance growth, and what they take in hunting and fishing."26 Hutcheson seems to assume, moreover, in the manner of Pufendorf and Locke, that pasturage and agriculture had co-existed in the second age, while in addition much more emphasis, as compared to Pufendorf, is placed on the role played by changes in the mode of subsistence, as a consequence of the growth of population, in the explanation of the development of the concept of property.

As far as the introduction of commerce is concerned, the Short introduction provides us with a worthy summary of Hutcheson's ideas on the subject. This account, which is included in the chapter devoted to derived property, is of considerable importance. It also shows Smith's indebtedness to his old master in a larger range of topics, and deserves quotation in extenso:

"'tis to be observed, that the common interest of all constantly requires an intercourse of office, and the joint labours of many: and that where mankind grow numerous, all necessaries and conveniences will be much better supplied to all, when each one choses an art to himself, by practice acquire dexterity in it, and thus provides himself great plenty of such goods as that art produced, to be exchanged in commerce for the goods produced in like manner by other artisans, than if each one by turns practised ever}' necessary art, without ever acquiring dexterity in any of them.

'tis plain too, that when men were multiplied considerably, all lands of easy culture must soon have been occupied, so that there would none remain in common; and that many could find none to occupy for their support, such persons therefore would have no other fund than their own bodily strength or ingenuity, that by their common or artificial labours they might procure necessaries for themselves: the

26 S. von Pufendorf, op. cit., p. 331.
Here, Hutcheson is clearly stressing the idea that whereas the concept of derived property can be applied in earlier and more primitive ages, nevertheless, it becomes a social phenomenon only with the appearance of the division of labour, which, in turn, is originated by lack of free land. In other words, in Hutcheson's view, derived property as a social phenomenon is a peculiar institution of the exchange economy.

If we look now at the way in which Smith, in the section devoted to the development of property, introduces the stage of commerce in LJA (where his treatment of this subject is much more clear and extensive than in LJB), we do not need to go very far in search of his mentor. After having gradually advanced into the age of agriculture, Smith notes that "as society was further improved, the several arts, which at first would be exercised by each individual as far as was necessary for his welfare, would be separated; some persons would cultivate one and others others, as they severally inclined. They would exchange with one another what they produce more than was necessary for their support, and get in exchange for them the commodities they stood in need of and did not produce themselves. . . ."28 Thus at last the Age of Commerce arises.28

By comparing this with Hutcheson's corresponding passage, quoted above, it may be said that so far as the causes of the introduction of commerce are concerned, Hutcheson's account, with its emphasis on the disappearance of available unoccupied lands and the consequent necessity for people without property in land to rely "for their support" on "their own bodily strength or ingenuity", is perhaps more exhaustive and coherent than Smith's own explanation as included in LJA. In Hutcheson's works and in the Anderson notes we can find elements, at least, of "stadial" theories of the development of property, both of which

27 F. Hutcheson, A short introduction . . ., op. cit., p. 163–64. In Book III, p. 199, Hutcheson expresses the same concept in the chapter devoted to explain the duties and rights of masters and servants: "As soon as mankind were considerably increased in numbers, and the more fertile lands occupied, many accidents would occasion that a great many would have no property, nor any opportunity of employing their labours on goods of their own for their support: and many on the other hand who had much property would need the labours of others, be willing to support them on this account, and give them further compensation: this would introduce the relation of master and servant. The labours of any person of tolerable strength and sagacity are of much more value than his bare maintenance. We see that the generality of healthy people can afford a good share of the profits of their labours for the support of a young family, and even for pleasure and gayety".

28 LJA, p. 15–6.
relate to the Pufendorf tradition. But, while the Anderson notes seem to be strictly dependent on this tradition, Hutcheson's own version introduces some elements which were not clearly established by Pufendorf himself, such as the emphasis placed on the relation between the growth of population and changes in the mode of subsistence together with the impressive description of the introduction of commerce.

Hutcheson, however, did not explicitly state a temporal succession through which individually nations naturally tend to pass. His own use of the "stadal" approach, moreover, is only related to the development of the concept of property, and the passages quoted above are practically all we can find in his writings. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that we are here facing anticipations of the "four-stages" theory and not the theory itself, we can say that these passages, taken together with Hutcheson's belief that the state of natural liberty still "subsists in some ruder parts of the world", his hints to the fact "that property, and that chiefly in lands, is the natural foundation upon which power must rest", and, last but not least, with his Lockean hypothesis of the origin of property, strongly suggest he was not as far as Meek supposed him to be from that train of thinking to which the mature version of the "four-stages" theory belongs.

IV

All the arguments developed in this paper reinforce the interpretation of a number of scholars who have already pointed out the influential role played by Pufendorf and Hutcheson in the development of Adam Smith's thought.

In particular, the Anderson notes provide us with direct evidence that in the first half of his teaching at Glasgow University Adam Smith was working strictly inside the Pufendorf–Hutcheson stream. In this connection two elements must be stressed: firstly, that the location of the topics included in Hutcheson's System is to be explained in terms of his interest in jurisprudence; secondly, that in doing so Hutcheson cleared the way to Adam Smith, who detached arguments so located and gave them a distinct status as a purely economic contribution while preserving the same order of treatment.

The comparison between the Anderson notes and the Glasgow Lectures shows in fact that it was only in the second half of his teaching period that Smith collated all the economic notions, which were scattered under different headings in his previous lectures, as they were in Pufendorf's and Hutcheson's works, by including them in a section entitled "Police" since, as Taylor suggests "the regulation of prices and the creation of coinage both came under the meaning of this word as it was used at that time".

Finally as far as the development of the "four stages" theory is concerned, it now appears that if it is possible to find "elements of at any rate a four stages theory"\(^{31}\) in the Anderson notes, then the same elements can be found in Pufendorf's *De Jure* and in the works of Francis Hutcheson: the latter in a more advanced form than that found in Smith. Given this conclusion it must also be said that it greatly weakens the hypothesis suggested in many places by Ronald Meek of Smith's priority in putting forward a version of the theory.

The next question, to which unfortunately we do not have a precise answer, is how, when, and why, Smith departed from his masters by including in his lectures a mature version of the "four-stages" theory and by building up the section on "Police, Revenue, and Arms", from which the *Wealth of Nations* is in part derived.